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Medicalisation is a social phenomenon in which conditions that 
were once under legal, religious, personal or other jurisdictions are 
brought into the domain of medical authority. Low sexual desire in 
females has been medicalised, pathologised as a disease, and 
intervened upon with a range of pharmaceuticals. There are two 
polarised positions on the medicalisation of low female sexual 
desire: I call these the mainstream view and the critical view. I 
assess the central arguments for both positions. Dividing the two 
positions are opposing models of the aetiology of low female sexual 
desire. I conclude by suggesting that the balance of arguments 
supports a modest defence of the critical view regarding the 
medicalisation of low female sexual desire. 
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Medicalisation is a social phenomenon in which conditions that were once 
under legal, religious, personal or other jurisdictions are brought into the 
domain of medical authority. Low sexual desire in females has been 
medicalised, pathologised as a disease, and intervened upon with a range 
of pharmaceuticals. There are two polarised positions on the 
medicalisation of low female sexual desire. The mainstream view—
implicitly held or explicitly articulated by many physicians, patient 
advocacy groups, pharmaceutical companies, activists, and policy 
makers—is that the medicalisation of low female sex desire is appropriate. 
Many females with low sexual desire suffer distress, on the mainstream 
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view, and medicine is the correct jurisdiction for the alleviation of such 
suffering. Sexual desire, on this view, is like an appetite—a function of 
biological features such as hormone balances or neurotransmitter 
concentrations—and low sexual desire can be modulated by exogenous 
interventions on these biological features.  
 
The critical view—implicitly held or explicitly articulated by some 
psychiatrists, psychologists, journalists, activists, and academic 
commentators—is that the medicalisation of low female sexual desire is 
pernicious. These critics argue that low sexual desire ought to be 
understood not as a disease but rather as a phenomenon arising out of a 
particular social context, and thus medicine is not the correct jurisdiction 
for females who experience low sexual desire. Sexual desire, on the critical 
view, is not solely or typically a function of biological causes but rather is 
typically a function of social causes—perhaps as a result of stress or fatigue 
or uneducated partners or toxic relationships or other diseases or even as a 
harmful effect of medications for those other diseases. Such critics 
sometimes claim that the very notion that one’s sexual desires are 
dysfunctionally low involves appealing to culturally-determined norms of 
sexuality, or relational imbalances between the sexual desires of a female 
and her partner, and are not necessarily intrinsic harms to a female with 
low desire herself. 
 
In short, there exist two antagonist positions regarding the medicalisation 
of low female sexual desire. In practice the positions are not always so 
clearly demarcated—the psychiatrist Rosemary Basson, for example, 
contributed to the development of the contemporary diagnostic category of 
low female sexual desire while also criticising the use of pharmaceutical 
interventions for the alleged disease. Nevertheless, there are clear trenches 
on the ground, and both sides are armed with statistics, science, patient 
testimonies, campaigns, and principled arguments of varying quality. 
  
When asked about the potentially nefarious consequences of medicalising 
low female sexual, Irwin Goldstein, a urologist and prominent defender of 
the medicalisation of female sexual desire, deflected the concern by 
responding “that’s a question for some philosopher” (Quoted in Moynihan 
2003). Here I describe and assess several of the most important arguments 
from both positions regarding the medicalisation of low female sexual 
desire.1 I begin by tracing conceptualisations of low female sexual desire 
beginning in the early twentieth century (§2). This is stage-setting. I 
 
1 In this paper I use the term ‘female’; although the scientific literature that this paper addresses often 
uses the terms ‘woman’ and ‘female’ interchangeably, the putative disease in question targets the 
biological category ‘female’ (and this term appears in the name of the disease), and an inclusion 
criterion for the clinical studies is status as a biological female. 




proceed to articulate and assess several of the most important arguments 
for the mainstream view (§3) and the critical view (§4). Dividing the two 
positions are opposing models of the aetiology of low female sexual desire 
(§5). I conclude by suggesting that the balance of arguments supports a 
modest defence of the critical view regarding the medicalisation of low 
female sexual desire (§6). 
 
 
2. Conceptualizations of Low Female Sexual Desire 
 
Though Foucault flagged the middle of the nineteenth century as the 
moment in which a sub-discipline of medicine devoted to sex appeared, 
the focus during this nascent period of sex medicine was the ‘paraphilias’ 
or ‘sexual perversions’ (sexual desire for an atypical object or activity in 
which such desire causes distress to the desirer or harm to others).2 Low 
sexual desire in females has been pathologized by psychiatry and related 
disciplines since the final years of the nineteenth century (Angel 2010). 
Marital advice manuals, psychoanalytic texts, psychiatric diagnostic 
manuals, sexologists, and feminist critics of much of this discourse have 
articulated numerous theories about low female sexual desire, including 
what constitutes female sexual dysfunction, and its causes and optimal 
modes of treatment. There are two broad classes of models of low female 
sexual desire: an appetitive or biological model, which holds that low 
female sexual desire is a result of a dysfunction in a physiological capacity, 
and a social or contextual model, which holds that low female sexual desire 
is a result of features of a female’s social or cultural context (§5).  
 
The way in which low female sexual desire has been conceived has 
changed often, as illustrated by the various editions of the DSM. The first 
edition, published in 1952, included ‘frigidity’, which was the closest of 
the female sexual dysfunctions in this edition to what we would now call 
low sexual desire—frigidity was characterised as disinterest in 
heterosexual intercourse or lack of pleasure from intercourse (other female 
sexual dysfunctions in the first edition included ‘involutional 
melancholia’, dyspareunia, and ‘nymphomania’). After the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the diagnosis of too much desire 
(nymphomania) was eliminated from the third edition, published in 1980. 
The third edition added the category ‘inhibited sexual desire’ as the 
diagnosis for low sexual desire in both males and females. The revision to 
 
2 The Russian physician Heinrich Kaan published his ‘Psychopathia Sexualis’ in 1846, in which he re-
interpreted Christian sins into medical diseases; he characterised masturbation and fantasies to be the 
basis sexual disorders. ⁠ In Foucault’s 1974-75 lectures at College de France he noted that Kaan’s book 
“was the first treatise of psychiatry to speak only of sexual pathology but the last to speak of sexuality 
solely in Latin”. Kraft-Ebbing’s more influential book of the same title appeared forty years later. 
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the third edition, published in 1987, perhaps cleansing itself of its 
psychoanalytic hangover, renamed inhibited sexual desire as ‘hypoactive 
sexual desire disorder’ (again for both males and females). The present 
edition of the DSM is the fifth, published in 2013. Hypoactive sexual desire 
disorder has been divided into a male version (male hypoactive sexual 
desire disorder), and a female version: female sexual interest/arousal 
disorder.  
 
Parallel to the evolution of the DSM, developments in the scientific and 
feminist study of sex provided new ways of conceiving of disorders of 
sexual desire. From Freud’s psychoanalysis and Kinsey’s statistics, from 
the laboratory work of Masters and Johnson, from feminist-inspired 
sociological, psychological and psychiatric work of those such as Hite and 
Tiefer and Basson, we now have multiple conceptualisations of the causes 
and constituents of low female sexual desire. 
 
Freud developed psychoanalysis in part based on the idea that many of our 
psychopathologies are based on forms of psychological repression, and he 
most prominently applied this to sex. The frigidity of some women, 
according to Freud, was a result of psychogenic causes. Famously, Freud 
(1905) claimed that clitoral orgasms are a sign of immature sexual 
development, which held some sway into the middle of the twentieth 
century. Kinsey was critical of the psychoanalytic approach to sexual 
desire, and instead adopted a ‘capacity’ model, which held that different 
people had differing intrinsic sexual capacities. These capacities were 
physiological in nature, and they manifest in behaviour, specifically the 
frequency of a person’s sexual activities. Females, on average, had lower 
sexual capacities than males, claimed Kinsey. Kinsey thought that such 
variability in a physiological sex capacity better explained variability in 
sexual desires compared with a repression model. 3  Thus Kinsey 
foreshadowed a disease model of low sexual desire.  
 
This approach was continued by the laboratory studies of Masters and 
Johnson. They observed people having sexual intercourse and 
masturbating, and ultimately recorded over ten thousand orgasms while 
measuring various physiological features, which formed the empirical 
basis of their four-phase ‘sexual response cycle’: excitement, plateau, 
orgasm, and resolution. This theory was influential; for example, it was 
 
3 Kinsey wrote: “There is an inclination among psychiatrists to consider all unresponding individuals 
as inhibited, and there is a certain skepticism in the profession of the existence of people who are 
basically low in capacity to respond. This amounts to asserting that all people are more or less equal 
in their sexual endowments, and ignores the existence of individual variation. No one who knows how 
remarkably different individuals may be in morphology, in physiologic reactions, and in other 
psychologic capacities, could conceive of erotic capacities (of all things) that were basically uniform 
throughout a population” (Cited in Irvine 1990, 36). See also Weinrich (2014). 




adopted and modified by psychologists and psychiatrists revising the 
DSM. A central concern of the work of Masters and Johnson was to 
develop therapies for sexual dysfunctions, including physical problems 
such as vaginismus (spasms of the pelvic muscles which makes intercourse 
painful or impossible). Although the sexual response cycle was 
characterised in strictly physiological terms, Masters thought that sexual 
dysfunctions were usually due to psychogenic causes.4 
  
Critics argued that the human sexual response cycle theorised by Masters 
and Johnson is less apt for females than it is for males (see Basson 2000; 
Wood, Koch, and Mansfield 2006; Meana 2010). Their model did not 
include desire, assuming that desire occurred spontaneously. Though it 
was dubbed a ‘cycle’, critics called it ‘linear’, because it began with arousal 
and ended with orgasm and resolution. Critics noted that it ignored quality 
of relationships or other features of a female’s social context that can 
influence sexual experience. More recent theories of female sexual 
response have attempted to accommodate these considerations. Basson, for 
example, has argued that female sexual desire is typically responsive (to 
cues, partner initiation, arousal) rather than spontaneous; that female 
sexual experience is typically ‘circular’, in which arousal can lead to desire 
and satisfaction can generate new desire; and that female sexual desire is 
modulated by social contexts such as relationship intimacy (see Basson 
2000; Meana 2010). 
     
By the late 1970s, the most common form of female sexual dysfunction, 
the general term for the cluster of diseases of which low female sexual 
desire is one, was no longer physical problems like vaginismus, but rather 
involved low sexual desire (Irvine 1990; Kleinplatz 2018). This was the 
problem that sex therapists were most often seeing in their practice (See 
Irvine 1990; Everard et al. 2000; and the references in Meana 2010). The 
disease category for low female sexual desire today is ‘female sexual 
interest/arousal disorder’. To be diagnosed with this disease, four 
conditions must be met: a female must have at least three of the defining 
symptoms, the symptoms must persist for at least six months, those 
symptoms must cause her distress, and the symptoms should not be better 
explained by other medical conditions or relationship problems or 
medications. The defining symptoms are an absence of, or reduction in: 
 
• interest in sexual activity,  
• sexual thoughts or fantasies,  
• initiation of sexual activity and reception of a partner’s 
initiatives, 
 
4 Their first book was Masters and Johnson (1966). See also Fishman (2007). 
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• excitement or pleasure during sexual activity in most 
sexual encounters,  
• interest and arousal in response to sexual cues,  
• genital or non-genital sensations during sexual activity 
in most encounters. (DSM-5; see also Brotto 2010).  
 
This alleged disease, along with its predecessor (hypoactive sexual desire 
disorder), is the focal point for the debate regarding the medicalisation of 
low female sexual desire.  
 
 
3. The Mainstream View  
 
The mainstream view regarding the medicalisation of low female sexual 
desire is that this condition is a genuine disease, and thus it ought to be in 
the domain of medicine and is an apt target for diagnosis and medical 
intervention. Sexual functioning is a bodily phenomenon, on the 
mainstream view, and thus sexual dysfunctions are diseases like other 
bodily dysfunctions. Low sexual desire can cause various forms of 
suffering. Since medicine can sometimes help alleviate some forms of 
suffering, at least when such suffering is caused by a disease, there is a 
principled reason to think that low female sexual desire should be in the 
jurisdiction of medicine.  
 
The mainstream view has a wide range of adherents. As we saw in §2, the 
American Psychiatric Association has codified the condition as a disease 
in various editions of the DSM. Prominent medical scientists such as Irwin 
Goldstein and the sisters Laura Berman and Jennifer Berman have for 
decades promoted low female sexual desire as a disease to be treated with 
pharmaceuticals. Millions of prescriptions have been written in the United 
States for off-label testosterone use for low female sexual desire, and two 
drugs have been approved by the FDA for the condition (flibanserin and 
bremelanotide), though both have extremely modest beneficial effects and 
a range of harms (discussed below).5 In a survey of nearly two thousand 
professionals attending four medical conferences, 85% believed that 
hypoactive sexual desire disorder is a genuine medical problem (Bachman 
2006).6 We saw above that a spectrum of scholars have held low female 
sexual desire to be a disease, from Freud and Kinsey and Masters to Brotto 
and Basson.  
 
 
5 Regarding off-label testosterone prescriptions, see Simes and Snabes (2011) 
6 These were conferences of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Endocrine 
Society, the North American Menopause Society, and the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine. 




The primary arguments for the mainstream view are:  
 
The Argument from Suffering 
The Appetitive Argument 
The Argument from Female Equality 
The Argument from Treatment Success 
 
I will assess these arguments in that order.   
 
3.1 The Argument from Suffering 
 
The Argument from Suffering notes the prevalence of females with low 
sexual desire who experience distress from their condition. This argument 
is often buttressed by appealing to survey data which suggests that a very 
large percentage of females experience one or more of the symptoms that 
constitute the definition of the disease category. One particularly 
controversial report claimed that 43% of women suffer from some sort of 
sexual dysfunction (Laumann, Paik, and Rosen 1999; Berman, Berman, 
and Goldstein 1999; see Moynihan 2003 for criticism of this statistic). 
Critics claim that this figure is grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the most 
common problem that motivates visits to sex therapists for females is low 
sexual desire (see Irvine 1990; Kleinplatz 2018). Sometimes the 
widespread suffering caused by low sexual desire is deployed as a 
counterargument against the critical view: how insensitive and 
disrespectful it is to deny treatment to females who suffer.7 Sometimes this 
argument is mixed with suggestions of sexism: the scientific study and 
therapeutic treatment of sex has for long been androcentric, and now we 
can help males who suffer from erectile dysfunction, while proponents of 
the critical view are willing to let females suffer in silence.  
 
Though any form of suffering warrants sympathy, as an argument for the 
mainstream view the Argument from Suffering is question-begging. It 
assumes as a premise—that low female sexual desire should be in the 
domain of medicine—the issue which is under dispute. Not all forms of 
suffering are in the domain of medicine. One need only consider the 
suffering caused by hunger or climbing high mountains or listening to 
country music. Even if we grant that low female sexual desire causes 
suffering, this does not support the mainstream view on medicalisation of 
low female sexual desire.   
 
 
7 Segal (2018) offers a rhetorical analysis of an FDA meeting at which flibanserin was discussed, and 
she notes that this argument—the suffering caused by an ‘unmet medical need’—was one of several 
offered by promoters of the drug.  
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Moreover, we will see below that the notion of suffering in this context is 
contested (§4). Critics hold that the suffering associated with low female 
sexual desire is typically not an intrinsic harm to the females with the 
condition, but rather arises as a result of social norms of sexuality or 
relationship difficulties. To consider an analogy, a homosexual male in 
present-day Russia might suffer distress from his sexual orientation, not 
because his sexual orientation is intrinsically harmful (obviously), but 
because he lives in a society which subordinates and physically harms 
homosexuals. This rejoinder to the Argument from Suffering is itself 
inconclusive when deployed against the entire category of low female 
sexual desire, for reasons we will see in §4, though it is persuasive for some 
proportion of cases.     
 
3.2 The Appetitive Argument 
 
We saw above that some hold that sexual desire is like an appetite or 
physiological capacity, and low sexual desire is a result of dysfunction in 
this capacity. Kinsey, for example, believed that sexual desire is the result 
of a physiological capacity, akin to the capacity of our pancreas to produce 
insulin (Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin 1948). A low capacity in the latter 
is a disease (type 1 diabetes), hence a low capacity in the former is also a 
disease.  
 
A physiological capacity view has been widely adopted by those 
promoting low female sexual desire as a disease. Some theorise that low 
female sexual desire is a result of low levels of particular hormones such 
as testosterone—the Berman sisters are two prominent defenders of the 
mainstream view who frequently have claimed that low sexual desire in 
women can be treated with testosterone, and a testosterone patch was being 
developed for low female sexual desire but was ultimately rejected for 
consumer use by the FDA (because of concerns about harmful side effects 
such as heart attacks, breast cancer, and weight gain), though it was 
approved in Europe. Others theorise that low female sexual desire is a 
result of an imbalance in neurotransmitters (see for example Croft 2017); 
this is the basis of the first drug approved for low female sexual desire 
(flibanserin). After the success of Viagra for erectile dysfunction, its 
manufacturer began testing it for treating low sexual desire in women. All 
these attempts to develop pharmaceutical interventions for low female 
sexual desire assume a physiological capacity view of sexual desire.  
 
One problem with the Appetitive Argument is that it ignores the 
intentional, psychological, social, and cultural context of sexuality. In §4 I 
describe some of the substantive ways that this challenge has been 
articulated, though in §5 I argue that appealing to the causal aetiology of 




low female sexual desire offers more modest support to the critical view 
than its defenders suggest. A further problem with the Appetitive 
Argument is that thus far no physiological basis for low female sexual 
desire in general has been discerned. 
  
Nevertheless, it is plausible that for some females with low sexual desire, 
the cause of their low desire is indeed a result of a dysfunction in a 
physiological capacity. There are reasons to think that some hormone 
concentrations can influence sexual desire (in both males and females). We 
have empirical evidence suggesting that modulating physiological states 
with pharmaceuticals such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors can 
dampen sexual desire, which itself suggests that sexual desire has a 
biological basis of one form or another (Bala et al. 2018). Though this 
consideration might have some initial appeal for a defender of the 
mainstream view, it is in fact far from conclusive. That is because yet 
another problem with the Appetitive Argument is that many features of life 
which are non-medical have a grounding in a physiological capacity. 
Athletic prowess is a good example. One’s running speed is a function not 
only of training but also of an intrinsic physiological capacity. Alexei’s 
slow running speed might be a function of his unusually low intrinsic 
physiological capacity for running, but that does not entail that Alexei has 
a disease. 
 
However, the Appetitive Argument together with the Argument from 
Suffering are jointly persuasive, for at least some cases of low female 
sexual desire. It is plausible that some cases of low female sexual desire 
have a physiological aetiology, and that this causes those people to suffer 
(though in §4 we see that this latter premise must be understood with care). 
There is, thus, some reason to think that at least for some cases of low 
female sexual desire, those cases are genuine diseases.   
 
3.3 The Argument from Female Equality 
 
We saw above that proponents of the mainstream view sometimes frame 
the medicalisation of female sexual desire as an issue about equality 
between the sexes. There are grounds for thinking that sex research has 
been unduly focused on male sexuality. For example, during her research 
about evolutionary theories of the female orgasm, the philosopher 
Elizabeth Lloyd traced sociobiologists’ footnotes regarding the scientific 
study of orgasms, and she found that, in the context of theorising about 
female orgasms, many of the cited sources were in fact based on the study 
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of males (see Lloyd 2005; Okruhlik 1994).8  With the success of 
pharmaceutical treatments for erectile dysfunction beginning in the late 
1990s, there was an immediate motivation to develop an equivalent 
intervention for females. The Argument from Female Equality claims that 
it is only fair that disorders of female desire receive the same attention as 
their male equivalents. If male sexual dysfunctions can be medicalised, 
then so can female sexual dysfunctions. This argument was the basis of the 
name for the recent industry-funded patient advocacy campaign for the 
drug flibanserin: Even The Score.9 
 
This argument has several damning problems. It assumes that low male 
sexual desire itself ought to be in the domain of medicine. The argument 
seems to be: if low male sexual desire has been successfully medicalised, 
then so too should low female sexual desire. But the critical view on the 
medicalisation of low female sexual desire applies equally to low male 
sexual desire—critics have argued that male sexuality has been 
inappropriately medicalised (Tiefer 1986, 1994; Fishman 2007). 
Moreover, Bueter and Jukola (2020) convincingly argue that feminism has 
usually been deployed in criticisms of medicalisation and biological 
reductionism; therefore to cite concerns about female equality as grounds 
for upholding the disease status of low female sexual desire, with the 
ultimate aim of warranting pharmaceutical intervention for the condition, 
is far-fetched. 
  
Sometimes the Argument from Female Equality is made in the context of 
discussions about interventions. The argument goes: males have access to 
effective interventions for their sexual dysfunctioning, and therefore so 
should females. But what, critics have asked, is the female analogy of 
intervening on erectile dysfunction? One hypothesis that received some 
study was: just as pharmaceuticals like Viagra work by increasing blood 
flow to the penis, perhaps some interventions can increase blood flow to 
the clitoris. A barrier to this approach, however, is that many empirical 
studies suggest little correlation between physical signs of arousal in 
females, such as vaginal blood flow, and subjective feelings of arousal and 
desire. 10  Similarly, treatment of erectile dysfunction is not in fact an 
intervention for low male sexual desire, and thus, at least in the context of 
interventions, the Argument from Female Equality does not bear on 
whether low female sexual desire should be medicalised.  
 
 
8 Taylor (2015) and Angel (2012) note the uneasy and complicated relationship between feminism and 
the medicalisation of low female sexual desire. 
9 See Segal (2018) for a critical account of various articulations of this argument.  
10 Though such findings have been observed for decades, they have been demonstrated in an elegant 
series of experiments by Meredith Chivers. See Chivers et al. (2010) for a review. 




3.4 The Argument from Treatment Success 
 
Prominent advocates of the mainstream view have claimed that low female 
sexual desire can be successfully modulated by pharmaceuticals. This, 
proponents claim, is a reason to think that low female sexual desire should 
be in the domain of medicine.   
 
Such proclamations of treatment success are laughable in their hyperbolic 
contradictions of empirical data. Irwin Goldstein, for instance, claimed that 
when preparing the FDA submission for flibanserin, the worry was not that 
the drug would be perceived as enhancing female sexual desire too little, 
but that it would be perceived as enhancing female sexual desire too 
much—the company did not want to elicit the concern that the drug would 
be “turning women into nymphomaniacs”.11 The drug in question was 
rejected by the FDA twice, before it was finally approved during the Even 
The Score campaign. The basis of the rejections were the tiny observed 
beneficial effects of the drug, and concerns about its harm profile (one trial 
testing the safety of this drug to treat low sexual desire in females included 
only males). Earlier attempts to develop testosterone interventions also 
floundered upon careful evaluation. The second and thus far last drug 
approved for low female sexual desire (bremelanotide) has an effect size 
similar to that of flibanserin. On average, compared with placebo, 
flibanserin is associated with an increase of about one ‘sexually satisfying 
event’ every two months (Jaspers et al. 2016). 
 
 
4. The Critical View 
 
Critics have argued that low female sexual desire has been inappropriately 
medicalised. This charge involves a number of related claims: that low 
female sexual desire is a normal part of life, that low female sexual desire 
is not caused by medical problems but rather is caused by social, relational, 
or cultural factors, that the very idea that low female sexual desire is a 
problem reflects particular social values, that the best way to help low 
female sexual desire (assuming help is called for) involves non-medical 
interventions, and that the condition has been constructed as a disease in 
part because of the financial gains to be had by selling treatments for it. 
 
The critical view has a range of adherents. The New View Campaign, led 
by psychologist Leonore Tiefer, is among the more visible organisations 
 
11 In Goldstein’s words: “When you’re going to the FDA with this kind of drug, there’s the sense that 
you want your effects to be good but not too good (…) there was a lot of discussion about it by the 
experts in the room, the need to show that you’re not turning women into nymphomaniacs. There’s a 
bias, a bias against—a fear of creating the sexually aggressive woman.” Cited in Bergner (2014). 
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defending the critical view, and John Bancroft, the former director of the 
Kinsey Institute, has also defended the critical view. The journalist Ray 
Moynihan has published a number of articles and books in which he 
decries medicalisation practices such as ‘disease-mongering’ or ‘selling 
sickness’, and he has applied such arguments to low female sexual desire. 
Several academic commentators have aligned themselves with the critical 
view of medicalising low female sexual desire in scholarly publications 
(see. e.g. Kaschak and Tiefer 2001; Moynihan 2003; Moynihan and 
Mintzes 2010; Bancroft 2002; Taylor 2015; Angel 2012; Cacchioni 2015). 
  
The primary arguments for the critical view are:  
 
The Spurious Disease Argument 
The Construction of Distress Argument  
The Argument from Treatment Failure 
The Conflict of Interest Argument 
The Harms Argument 
 
I address each in turn, going from subtle to simple.  
 
4.1 The Spurious Disease Argument 
 
Sometimes the debate about the medicalisation of a condition involves the 
claim that the condition is, or is not, a genuine disease. If a condition is a 
genuine disease, then, goes this thought, it should be in the domain of 
medicine; if a condition is not a genuine disease, then there is at least some 
reason to suppose that the condition should not be in the domain of 
medicine (though medicine does have in its domain conditions that are not 
diseases, such as pregnancy). In §3 we saw the Appetitive Argument for 
the mainstream view. The Spurious Disease Argument for the critical view 
denies the appetitive model of low sexual desire. Indeed, the charge of 
medicalisation of low female sexual desire often involves a denial of the 
capacity view of sexual desire, or at least a denial that the capacity view is 
a complete explanation for varying strengths of sexual desire. Critics argue 
that the view of low sexual desire as a deficiency in a physiological 
capacity is excessively reductionist, and to understand a female’s low 
sexual desire we must take into account that female’s broader social 
context.12 To properly understand why a female has low sexual desire, one 
must consider many features of her life, including her general health, levels 
 
12  See, among many others, Tiefer (1991). Leiblum, for example, claimed that “Inferring that 
hormones, in general, are the primary motivators of sexual activity in humans is a gross 
oversimplification” (2002, 65). 




of stress, competing interests, and features of her past and present 
relationships. 
  
Taking this contextual approach further, some feminists such as Catherine 
MacKinnon (1989) argue that a theory of female sexuality must be located 
within a broader theory of gender inequality. A proper characterisation of 
female sexual dysfunction should not begin with the assumption that 
normal healthy human sexual desire is that of males. Male sexual desire is, 
obviously, itself influenced by social shaping. Moreover, male and female 
sexual desire is radically different, claims MacKinnon (which is itself a 
controversial premise). Females who seem to have dysfunctionally low 
female sexual desire should instead be seen as resisting a male-centric 
system and standards of sexuality.13 Cases of apparent low sexual desire—
at least many cases—should be understood, argues MacKinnon and others, 
as appropriate responses to gender inequality and sexual violence. 
  
A more mundane version of the Spurious Disease Argument was voiced 
by none other than Lori Brotto, a psychologist who chaired the DSM-5 
sexuality committee—the group which developed the disease category 
‘female sexual interest/arousal disorder’. When interviewed about low 
female sexual desire, Brotto claimed: “Sometimes I wonder whether it isn’t 
so much about libido as it is about boredom”. Brotto was referring to the 
typical decline in sexual desire that occurs in long-term monogamous 
relationships.14 
 
If the Spurious Disease Argument is meant as a thesis about some token 
instances of low female sexual desire, then it is convincing, since it is 
surely plausible that for some females diagnosed with the disease, their 
condition is better understood as arising from their social context rather 
than from their intrinsic physiological capacities. However, if the Spurious 
Disease Argument is meant as a thesis about the disease itself, as a kind, 
then it is less convincing, since the thesis would deny that any particular 
instance of low female sexual desire could be a case of disease. That, 
though, would be committed to claiming that there does not exist a female 
with low sexual desire for whom their condition is a disease. And that is 
implausible. To see why, consider what any of the leading philosophical 
theories of disease must say about a female who, for the sake of argument, 
 
13 It is a mistake, argues MacKinnon, to see women with low sexual desire “as in need of explanation 
and adjustment, stigmatized as inhibited and repressed and asexual” (1989, 141) 
14 The Brotto interview is reported in (Bergner 2014). During therapy for women diagnosed with low 
sexual desire, Brotto noted that “the impact of relationship duration is something that comes up 
constantly”. For this reason, Bergner, who conducted this interview, calls drugs like flibanserin less of 
an intervention for libido and more of an intervention for monogamy. 
EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 2 | 2021  Special issue Philosophy of medicine article 4 
 18 
suffers genuine distress as a result of her low sexual desire (we will see 
below that this premise requires nuance).  
 
Normativism about disease holds, roughly, that if a condition is disvalued 
and if medicine can help, then that condition is a disease. For the Spurious 
Disease Argument to work as a thesis about the disease itself, assuming 
normativism, one would have to deny either that the condition is disvalued 
(but we have granted for the sake of argument that the female in question 
suffers), or that for all females who experience low sexual desire, medicine 
cannot help. This latter premise is of course empirical, but it is extremely 
implausible. Naturalism about disease, on the other hand, holds roughly 
that if a condition involves a statistical departure from normal functioning, 
and that dysfunctioning impedes with the ultimate aims of survival and 
reproduction, then that condition is a disease. For the Spurious Disease 
Argument to work as a thesis about the disease itself, assuming naturalism, 
one would have to deny that there exists a female whose sexual desire is 
much lower than the statistical norm and which impedes her survival or 
reproduction. This, again, is highly implausible. My favoured account of 
disease is a hybrid account, which also entails that the Spurious Disease 
Argument cannot be about the disease itself as a general kind.15 (It is worth 
noting that the arguments in this paragraph dodge the question about 
aetiology altogether—we will return to this in §5.) 
 
To sum: the Spurious Disease Argument may be compelling when 
understood as thesis about some instances of low female sexual desire, but 
not when understood about the entire disease category.16 Of course, among 
all the females who are diagnosed with a disease of low sexual desire, the 
proportion for whom the Spurious Disease Argument applies remains an 
open question. We have seen several reasons to think that for many females 
who are diagnosed with a disease of low sexual desire, their condition is 
better understood in social or cultural terms, and so their diagnosis may be 
inappropriate. Thus, the Spurious Disease Argument provides less warrant 
to a general thesis of medicalisation of low female sexual desire, and more 
warrant to what Gabriel and Goldberg (2014) call ‘disease inflation’: the 
expansion of diagnostic categories and the loosening of diagnostic 
practices and prescription norms such that more and more people are said 
to be diseased and are prescribed interventions.  
 
 
15 On normativism, see Cooper (2002). On naturalism, see Boorse (1977). On hybridism, see Stegenga 
(2015). 
16 Some proponents of the critical view are occasionally slippery on this point. Moynihan, for example, 
claims that while it is surely true that some females have a genuine disease of low sexual desire, the 
disease category itself is the “freshest, clearest example” of “the corporate sponsored creation of a 
disease” (2003). 




One further nuance is worth mentioning. The above discussion relied on a 
distinction between condition types and condition tokens: the Spurious 
Disease Argument fails as a thesis about the condition type (the general 
category of low female sexual desire), but it might succeed as a thesis about 
condition tokens (Sveta’s low sexual desire is not a case of genuine disease, 
it is a result of an abusive marriage). The underlying premise is that claims 
of medicalisation should apply to condition tokens rather than condition 
types, because two people could have the same type of condition in which 
one of the tokens is constituted by a disease and the other is not. But this 
would only make sense if by ‘condition’ one meant ‘cluster of symptoms’: 
one cluster of symptoms could be caused by a disease, while another 
cluster of those same symptoms could be caused by some non-disease state 
(for example, Maria’s sadness and crying and sleeplessness are caused by 
her depression, while Sofia’s sadness and crying and sleeplessness are 
caused by the recent breakup with her spouse). But if by ‘condition’ one 
meant ‘whole disease entity, including symptoms and physiological causes 
of those symptoms’, then two tokens of a condition would share all 
physical features, and thus, arguably, two tokens of the same condition 
would either both be genuine diseases or both be non-disease conditions. 
All tokens of type 1 diabetes are cases of genuine disease, while all tokens 
of appreciating country music are non-disease conditions (though distress-
inducing nevertheless). Since the Spurious Disease Argument fails as a 
thesis about condition types, it can only succeed as a thesis about some 
condition tokens. But how could it be, following the above line, that some 
tokens of a condition are genuine diseases while other tokens of the 
condition are not genuine diseases, if they are tokens of the same 
condition? One answer which has tempted many defenders of the critical 
view, and which we have already touched upon, is to distinguish genuine 
disease tokens from spurious disease tokens according to the aetiology of 
those tokens. This, finally, brings us to a remaining nuance for Spurious 
Disease Argument, which I address in §5.   
 
4.2 The Construction of Distress Argument 
  
To be diagnosed with female sexual interest/arousal disorder, the DSM 
stipulates that a female must suffer distress from her symptoms of low 
sexual desire. At first glance this seems like a reasonable requirement, 
since the symptoms alone are not necessarily pathological and it is hard to 
see what other reason medicine could have to hold that a female with such 
symptoms is diseased. Indeed, many asexuals have no sexual desire at all 
and yet do not experience distress as a result, and many would deny that 
they have a disease. However, the requirement that a female experience 
distress from her symptoms of low desire in order to be diagnosed raises 
difficult questions. The Construction of Distress argument holds that the 
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distress that a female with low sexual desire experiences can be a result of 
social or cultural features of the female’s context, rather than a result of the 
symptoms themselves (we saw the Construction of Distress Argument 
foreshadowed as a response to the mainstream position’s Argument from 
Suffering in §3). A female could experience such distress if she felt that 
she was not satisfying social norms regarding sexual activity or pleasure. 
Such norms might be generated by manifold social forces, such as peers, 
advertising, and pornography. Moreover, such norms might be 
unwarranted or thoroughly pernicious.   
 
The Construction of Distress argument has an additional complexity. 
Female sexual desire is often deemed low only relative to the strength of 
their typically male partners. Such distress, in many cases of low female 
sexual desire, might not be intrinsic, but rather might be relational. That is, 
such distress can arise not from the female’s symptoms directly, but rather 
from relationship difficulties which arise due to an imbalance of desire 
with her partner (see, e.g., Irvine 1990).17  
 
A curious proviso to the description of female sexual interest/arousal 
disorder in the DSM-5 notes that there is variability in the prevalence of 
low sexual desire in different cultures, and cautions:  
 
A judgement about whether low sexual desire reported by a 
woman from a certain ethnocultural group meets criteria for 
female sexual interest/arousal disorder must take into account 
the fact that different cultures may pathologise some behaviors 
and not others. (APA 2013, 436) 
 
This appears to be a form of cultural relativism regarding whether a case 
of low female sexual desire should be deemed a disease or not. One might 
think that this is muddled, since whether a person has a disease should not 
depend on culture-specific idiosyncrasies regarding whether that culture 
pathologizes the condition in question. However, such cultural relativism 
of disease attribution could be reasonable if it is the case that in some 
cultures a female with low sexual desire experiences distress while in other 
cultures a female with low sexual desire experiences no distress, due to 
differences in the extent to which the cultures pathologises low female 
sexual desire. But this faces the Construction of Distress argument: the 
distress that females experience because of the pathologizing tendencies of 
their culture are, trivially, a result of their culture, and not a result of 
 
17 Taylor (2015) notes that many of the alleged cases of successful treatment of low female sexual 
desire described by the Berman sisters involved females who were distressed as a result of partner 
frustration (Berman, Berman, and Bumiller 2001). 




intrinsic harms caused by the condition itself. The DSM is explicitly 
asserting that the distress caused by low female sexual desire is a cultural 
construction—a puzzling gesture of support for the critical view from what 
could be taken as the bible of the mainstream view. 
   
Responding to the Construction of Distress argument, defenders of the 
mainstream view claim that the argument ignores or trivialises suffering of 
some females with low sexual desire (see Jackson 2004). Yet, if the source 
of the distress is indeed a result of the pathologizing tendency of a society, 
on its face this suggests that diagnosing the condition as a disease and 
subsequently treating it with biological interventions is misguided. Further, 
in §5 I argue that the causal aetiology of complex traits such as strength of 
sexual desire probably involve causes at multiple scales, including both 
biological and social causes.  
 
4.3 The Argument from Treatment Failure 
 
We have seen that an argument for the mainstream view appeals to claims 
about the successful treatment of low female sexual desire, and that these 
claims are empirically implausible. The critical view turns this argument 
around in the Argument from Treatment Failure, in which the low 
effectiveness of interventions for low female sexual desire is cited in the 
context of discussing the condition’s medicalisation (see Moynihan 2014). 
The drugs introduced in the last couple of decades to treat erectile 
dysfunction are among the most successful pharmacological developments 
of the last several decades (by various metrics: capacity to modulate the 
condition, number of prescriptions, number of men taking the drugs, 
profitability for the manufacturers; but not, obviously, to save lives or 
mitigate symptoms of mortal diseases). Conversely, only two of many 
experimental drugs for low female sexual desire have made it through the 
research and regulatory pipeline, and these drugs have extremely modest 
beneficial effects for females but significant harms (see below). Drugs to 
improve low female sexual desire have been failures. One possible 
explanation for such failures is that the condition is not a genuine disease. 
The underlying argument is: so far there has been no effective intervention 
developed for low female sexual desire; if low female sexual desire were 
a genuine disease, an effective intervention would have, by now, been 
developed; thus, low female sexual desire is not a genuine disease. 
 
One response to the failure of female desire drugs has been to conclude 
that female sexuality is complex. Indeed, this appeal to the complexity of 
female sexual desire formed the basis of criticisms of the development of 
pharmaceutical interventions for female sexual desire, voiced by academic 
commentators and feminist advocacy groups, even prior to the empirical 
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failures of these drugs.18 No wonder such drugs have been failures, goes 
this argument: male sexual arousal may be physiologically simple, but 
female sexual desire is not.  
 
Treatment failure can, of course, be merely transient. Our failure to 
adequately treat type 1 diabetes until Banting and Best’s breakthrough did 
not entail that type 1 diabetes is not a genuine disease. Thus, the Argument 
from Treatment Failure is far from conclusive for the critical view. Yet, at 
the very least the Argument from Treatment Failure is a compelling 
rejoinder to the mainstream view’s Argument from Treatment Success.  
 
Moreover, the failure to modulate female desire with pharmaceuticals is 
not due to a lack of effort on the part of scientists and companies to find 
such a drug. The fantastic profits to be gained from a female desire drug 
have spurred an enormous search. This is a case in which absence of 
evidence is some evidence of absence. 19  The absence of evidence of 
effective medical treatments for low female sexual desire is some evidence 
that there is not going to be an effective medical treatment for low female 
sexual desire.20 We have some reason to think, now, that a drug for female 
sexual desire is not forthcoming. The inability to medically intervene on a 
condition provides at least some reason for thinking that the condition 
should not be in the jurisdiction of medicine.  
 
4.4 The Conflict of Interest Argument 
 
Sometimes the charge of medicalisation involves describing tactics used 
by interested parties in convincing others, especially physicians and 
potential future patients, that a condition is a disease. These tactics include 
organising meetings of experts with the aim of defining a disease, 
sponsoring medical education events to inform physicians about the 
condition, and performing research which suggests that the condition is 
under-diagnosed and under-treated (Moynihan 2003; Fishman 2004; 
Cacchioni 2015). The point of these tactics, of course, is to make money 




18 See Bueter and Jukola (2020), who argue that the flibanserin case involved a failure in the uptake of 
criticism, and thus the requirements of Longino’s theory of scientific objectivity were not satisfied. 
19 See Sober (2009) for an articulation of the formal conditions under which absence of evidence is 
indeed evidence of absence, contrary to standard statistical lore. 
20 Hacking’s infamous quip “if you can spray them, then they are real” (1983)—originally perhaps an 
unintended innuendo but here an unapologetic pun—might be apt here. 
21 As Taylor puts it: “The diagnosis is not about illness or abnormality; it is about making large numbers 
of people think that they are ill or abnormal so that corporations can profit” (2015). 




With respect to the question of medicalisation, an implicit premise of this 
argument seems to be that such tactics would be unnecessary if the 
condition were in fact a real disease. However, the same tactics cited in the 
argument—corporate-funded consensus conferences, medical education, 
awareness-raising campaigns, patient-advocacy groups—are deployed 
against genuine diseases, such as breast cancer, HIV, and depression. The 
Conflict of Interest Argument has some rhetorical sway, but is ultimately 
inconclusive as a consideration pertinent to medicalisation. That is not to 
say that conflicts of interest are not an important problem in medicine, in 
medical research, or in debates about the medical status of some 
conditions. Holman and Geisler (2018) use the case of flibanserin to show 
that in FDA consultation meetings, financial conflicts of interest appeared 
to influence the content of testimony offered by patient advocacy panelists, 
which in turn probably influenced the FDA decision to approve the drug 
(see also Segal 2018). Conflicts of interest almost surely had some causal 
influence on the determination of the putative disease status of low female 
sexual desire. Yet the same kinds of conflicts of interest are present in 
many areas of medicine and themselves do not necessarily impugn the 
medical status of a condition.  
 
4.5 The Harms Argument 
 
The potential harms of the medicalisation of low female sexual desire are 
numerous. The Harms Argument just says: the potential harms of 
medicalising low sexual desire are reasons not to medicalise the condition.   
One class of harms is the various adverse effects of the medical 
interventions used to treat low female sexual desire. At present this is 
primarily the drug flibanserin, which has several harmful effects, including 
fatigue, insomnia, and hypotension. 22  Another kind of harm is the 
reification of spurious and pernicious norms of sexuality.23 Reiheld argues 
that in general medicalisation can have the harm of reification, defined as 
“a process whereby the ontology of an idea shifts from mere concept to 
real manifestation” (2010, 77). One way this might occur is via looping 
effects of human classification, in which those people who are diagnosed 
with a condition come to see themselves and be seen and treated by others 
 
22 Taylor argues that “the medical treatment of FSD, as with the medical management of menopause, 
subjects women to health risks and disciplinary treatments in order to accommodate men and to 
maintain heterosexual marriages” (2015, 43). 
23 As John Bancroft, former director of the Kinsey Institute, claimed “The danger of portraying sexual 
difficulties as a dysfunction is that it is likely to encourage doctors to prescribe drugs to change sexual 
function—when the attention should be paid to other aspects of the woman's life. It’s also likely to 
make women think they have a malfunction when they do not.” (Quoted in Moynihan 2003). Wardrope 
(2015) argues that critiques of medicalisation can involve claiming that medicalisation involves 
‘hermeneutical injustice’. See also de Vries (2007), Verweij (1999), and Gagné-Julien (2021 this issue 
of EuJAP).  
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as fundamentally a kind of person (the kind with that condition), and 
thereby in various ways they become that kind of person.24 Medicalising 
any condition entails a range of financial costs. Finally, attention can be 
drawn away from the important causes of low female sexual desire. 
  
While these are important consideration, the Harms Argument is far from 
conclusive, since the medicalisation of all conditions comes with harm. 
Moreover, as Reiheld (2010) argues, medicalisation can also have benefits 
that offset or outweigh such harms, such as the demarginalisation of 
previously marginalised patient groups and destigmatisation of previously 
stigmatised conditions. Yet, at least in the case of low female sexual desire, 
and considering the Argument from Treatment Failure, the two arguments 
suggest that the benefit-harm ratio for medicalising low female sexual 
desire is poor. I argue in the following section that this pragmatic concern 




5. Etiological Models of Low Desire 
 
Thus far we have seen several theories about the aetiology of low female 
sexual desire. One main family of etiological models is based on 
physiological capacity for sexual desire, and the other main family of 
etiological modes is based on social context relevant to sexual desire. 
Proponents of the mainstream view have tended toward the physiological 
capacity models, whereas proponents of the critical view have tended 
toward the social context models.   
 
The physiological family of models states that people’s capacity for sexual 
desire varies, and low sexual desire is simply the result of underlying 
physiological causes, such as low testosterone levels or an imbalance in 
neurotransmitters. We saw above that this kind of model was favoured by 
Kinsey, and it is widely held today by pharmaceutical companies. A 
version of a social context etiological model for sexuality is the repression 
model, famously articulated by Freud, which states that people’s sexual 
desires are psychogenic, and can be modulated (mildly or extremely, 
leading in some cases to paraphilias) by psychological mechanisms. 
Another version of a social context etiological model is the oppression 
model, which states that females’ sexual desires are modulated by gender 
inequality, stress, fatigue, and fear of violence. This has been defended by 
feminists such as MacKinnon. Still another version of a social context 
etiological model is the boredom model, which states that the strength of 
 
24 This is Hacking’s (1995) “looping effects of human kinds”. 




sexual desire wanes in particular contexts, especially as a result of 
relationship duration. 
    
These models are not mutually exclusive, of course—low sexual desire can 
have multiple aetiologies. However, some of the more prominent 
defenders of the various models have tended to emphasise one model at 
the expense of the others. Kinsey, for example, downplayed the importance 
of social context as an explanation for low sexual desire and emphasised 
physiological capacity. 25  MacKinnon, conversely, downplayed the 
importance of physiological capacity and emphasised social context. Yet, 
all these aetiological models have some initial plausibility.  
 
We saw above that appealing to the aetiology of token instances of low 
female sexual desire could be a way to distinguish cases of low sexual 
desire which should be understood as genuine diseases from cases of low 
sexual desire which should not be understood as genuine diseases. The 
underlying premise of some appeals to the social context etiological 
models is that if a female’s low sexual desire is due to social or cultural 
causes, then this female does not have a disease, and thus to diagnose her 
with a disease amounts to inappropriately medicalising her condition.  
 
As persuasive as this claim may be, this line of argumentation requires care 
to avoid an ambiguity regarding causation of disease.    
 
Many conditions that people consider to be uncontroversially in the 
domain of medicine arise from causes that are, ultimately, social or 
cultural. Car accidents, sporting injuries, drug overdoses, and nuclear 
reactor meltdowns can all lead to conditions that are medical. In a trivial 
sense these causes of conditions are all social or cultural artefacts, yet we 
would not say that the resulting conditions are not genuine diseases. Well-
stocked grocery stores and liquor stores and pharmacies are the causes of 
a wide range of diseases, almost surely more than diseases caused by 
intrinsic physiological dysfunctions. A person’s social context can cause a 
wide range of genuine diseases. 
 
The distinction between social or cultural causes on the one hand and 
physiological causes on the other is less sharp than one might suppose. We 
have some understanding of the pathophysiological mechanisms in which 
infection with Mycobacterium tuberculosis causes symptoms of 
tuberculosis. But we also have some understanding of the mechanisms in 
 
25 Kinsey “consistently ignored the ways in which women as a social group may have been taught to 
avoid or dislike sex and sought biological explanations for their supposedly lower sexual capacity” 
(Irvine 1990, 40). 
EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 2 | 2021  Special issue Philosophy of medicine article 4 
 26 
which the social context of a prisoner in a crowded jail in Kyrgyzstan 
causes infection with, and subsequent symptoms of, tuberculosis.26 It is 
plausible that for many human conditions such as the strength of one’s 
sexual desire, the etiological causal nexus is extremely complex, and the 
relevant causes exist at various physical scales, from the chemical to the 
social, and various temporal scales, from the temporally distal to the 
temporally proximal.  
 
Perhaps what defenders of the critical view have in mind when they appeal 
to social or cultural models of aetiology of low female sexual desire is a 
distinction between proximal causes of a disease and distal causes of a 
disease. The presence of Mycobacterium tuberculosis is a proximal cause 
of symptoms. But how did the prisoner get infected with this bacterium? 
To explain this adequately one must cite the distal, social cause: jail 
overcrowding. This is a small victory for the critical view on 
medicalisation of low female sexual desire, however, because if our 
interest is in whether a condition is a genuine disease, then all that matters 
in our hypothetical case is the proximal cause, namely, the presence of the 
infectious bacterium. Since infectious diseases are far less controversially 
held to be genuine diseases, we have an argument that diagnosis by appeal 
to proximal causes of symptoms, and not distal causes, is not merely 
sanctioned by medical practice but is in fact normal medical practice. Why 
should diseases of sexual desire be any different? 
 
To give a concrete example of this in the debate about the medicalisation 
of low female sexual desire, in an insightful article about the 
medicalisation of female sexual dysfunction (FSD), Taylor argued that 
“Much of the problem with FSD seems to arise from lack of education, 
rather than from something aberrant about the women” (2015, 263). While 
this is almost certainly true, it is also true for many conditions that are 
uncontroversial diseases. When Alexei tells Mischa that it is safe to ski on 
this black diamond ski slope, or that he should take the blue pill rather than 
the red pill, or that one drives on the left side of the road in Canada, 
Mischa’s resulting dysfunctions arise from a lack of education (both his 
and Alexei’s), rather than anything aberrant about Mischa. And yet those 
dysfunctions could be genuine diseases.    
 
There is an important analogy with recent debates about depression, and 
because the pertinent arguments are similar, it is worth considering them. 
In the DSM-IV, the diagnostic category for depression had a ‘bereavement 
exclusion criterion’, such that a person who satisfied the symptomatic 
 
26 Furman (2017) applies such reasoning to argue that a full understanding of AIDS requires both 
physiological and social models. 




criteria for depression was excluded from a diagnosis of depression if they 
were bereaving. The thought was that a bereaving person’s symptoms of 
depression are better explained by the fact that they have lost a loved one 
rather than by the hypothesis that they have a disease (Horwitz and 
Wakefield 2007). Thus the bereavement exclusion criterion amounted to a 
consideration of a person’s social context when determining if that person 
has a disease (though the social context that was considered was narrow: 
there was no ‘recently unemployed exclusion criterion’ or ‘listened to 
excessive Nick Cave albums exclusion criterion’ or ‘broke up with 
girlfriend exclusion criterion’). Some commentators noted that 
bereavement does not immunise one against depression, and indeed, the 
loss of a loved one can cause depression—not just apparent symptoms of 
depression, but depression itself. So when revising the description of the 
disease category for the next edition of the DSM (DSM-5), the 
bereavement exclusion criterion was eliminated. Critics who had argued 
that the bereavement exclusion criterion did not go far enough in 
considering people’s social context were disappointed. However, we have 
seen that this appeal to social context in determining the status of a 
condition as a disease is inconclusive.  
 
In the DSM-5, the diagnostic criteria for female sexual interest/arousal 
disorder also stipulates a diagnostic exclusion criterion, based on social 
context. It reads as follows:  
 
If interpersonal or significant contextual factors, such as severe 
relationship distress, intimate partner violence, or other 
significant stressors, explain the sexual interest/arousal 
symptoms, then a diagnosis of female sexual interest/arousal 
disorder would not be made. (APA 2013, 436) 
 
Here the DSM makes a significant nod to social context aetiological 
models of low female sexual desire. But just as with depression, the 
deployment of such exclusion criteria assumes that there is a sharp 
distinction between social causes and physiological causes of a disease, 
which, I argued above, is not generally true. Presumably the “significant 
stressors” referred to in the exclusion criterion could itself cause disease, 
including low female sexual desire. Perhaps what the APA has in mind is 
that among cases of low female sexual desire, those cases with clear social-
context aetiologies should not be deemed cases of disease, while other 
cases should be; perhaps the assumption is that the remaining cases have a 
physiological aetiology. But why assume that the latter have a 
physiological aetiology? More pressing, why assume that the former do 
not have a physiological aetiology? We have seen that many conditions 
can have a social-context aetiology and be characterised by underlying 
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physiological states. Perhaps the APA (and proponents of the critical view) 
believes that low sexual desire is not one of those kinds of conditions. In 
any case, this exclusion criterion amounts to holding that one set of 
possible causes of low sexual desire (biological) should be de-emphasised 
when another set of possible causes (social) is present.  
 
The most plausible way of making sense of this social-context exclusion 
criterion for diagnosing low female sexual desire is pragmatic. The 
exclusion criterion makes sense in the context in which medical 
interventions can do little good for low female sexual desire in general, 
while the various factors stipulated as excluding a diagnosis—severe 
relationship distress, partner violence, or other stressors—can, at least in 
some cases (one optimistically hopes), be modified, and thus targeting 
social causes of low sexual desire can do much more good than targeting 
alleged physiological causes. Flibanserin may not help many females’ low 
sexual desire, but ending an abusive relationship might. Moreover, in 
addition to the known adverse effects that medications for low female 
sexual desire have on the body, one might worry about another sort of 
indirect harm: low desire which is a result of a female’s social context 
(relationship problems or work stress or …) might be a cue to modify this 
context (modify or end the bad relationship, for example), and medicating 
away that low desire (assuming that such interventions were in fact 
effective at increasing sexual desire) could silence this cue, and thus 
decrease the motive for positive change.   
 
Contrast this with erectile disorder. The DSM description for erectile 
disorder stipulates a similar exclusion criterion (the symptoms must not be 
better explained by relationship distress or other stressors). Now imagine 
Sergei, who is in a distressing relationship and has begun to experience 
symptoms of erectile dysfunction. His rule-following physician is 
forbidden from making a diagnosis of erectile disorder, despite the fact that 
she knows that an effective intervention is available. While it might be 
prudent for Sergei to reconsider aspects of his relationship, it would be 
excessively prudish to deny him the effective treatment that is now 
available, on the grounds that his condition has a social-context etiology.27 
This is not to say that the social-context etiological model is not important 
for Sergei; the same concern about an unintended mitigation of the motive 
for positive change applies. My suggestion here is pragmatic: since we 
have effective and relatively safe interventions for erectile disorder, 
worrying about whether Sergei has a genuine disease is fussy.  
 
 
27 Which might explain why in some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, one can purchase 
Viagra without a prescription or diagnosis. 




This pragmatic consideration—which foregrounds the consequences of 
deeming a condition a disease and asks whether medicine can effectively 
intervene on the condition—can inform a general approach to debates 
about the medicalisation of particular conditions. This approach sidesteps 
the need to determine whether a condition is a genuine disease according 
to a general philosophical theory of disease. This pragmatic approach is 
perhaps what lies at the heart of the critical view of the medicalisation of 
low female sexual desire, since interventions for low female sexual desire 
have been essentially failures, and, as the critical view notes, such 
medicalisation runs the risk of mitigating motivation for changing one’s 
social context. The concern about mitigating one’s motive for positive 
change suggests that there is an ethical dimension to this pragmatic 
consideration. Both the pragmatic and ethical considerations are about the 
consequences of intervening on low female sexual desire, rather than 




6. Conclusion  
 
In my survey of some of the primary arguments for the mainstream view, 
which holds that low female sexual desire should be under medical 
jurisdiction, I found most of the arguments on both sides inconclusive. All 
the arguments for the mainstream view are problematic, which itself lends 
some support to the critical view, since the status quo has little warrant 
(§3). However, the Argument from Suffering together with the Appetitive 
Argument lends some support to the conclusion that at least some cases of 
low female sexual desire belong in the domain of medicine.   
 
The arguments for the critical view, however, are on somewhat firmer 
ground (§4). The Construction of Distress Argument, while perhaps not 
applying to all females with low sexual desire, presumably applies to 
many. However, both the Spurious Disease Argument and the 
Construction of Distress Argument involve appeals to social context 
etiological models of low sexual desire, which, I argued in §5, is less 
convincing than proponents of the critical view claim.  
 
The most persuasive arguments for the critical view, I argued, involve 
pragmatic considerations of the harms and benefits of interventions for low 
female sexual desire. We have good reasons to think that medicine can do 
little for females with low sexual desire, and we also have good reasons to 
think that medicalising female sexual desire causes harms, and these 
considerations, while simpler than the various inconclusive arguments 
regarding the genuine disease status of low female sexual desire, are 
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enough to doubt whether low female sexual desire ought to be in the 
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